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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-1591 
______________ 
 
In Re: ENERGY FUTURE HOLDINGS CORP., ET AL., 
      Debtors 
 
DELAWARE TRUST COMPANY f/k/a CSC Trust Company Delaware, as Indenture 
Trustee, 
        Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE 
(D.C. No. 1-14-cv-00723) 
District Judge: Hon. Richard G. Andrews 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 23, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.  
(Filed: May 4, 2016) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Debtor Energy Future Holdings Corp. (“EFH”) and its subsidiaries, including 
Energy Future Intermediate Holdings Corp. (“EFIH”) (collectively, “Debtors”), with the 
approval of the Bankruptcy Court, settled claims with certain creditors holding notes 
secured by a lien on Debtors’ assets.  Delaware Trust Company, as indenture trustee (the 
“Trustee”), asserts that the settlement involved a tender offer that is impermissible in 
bankruptcy and that the settlement violates core principles of the bankruptcy process.  
Because the settlement was consistent with bankruptcy law, we will affirm. 
I 
Debtors comprise the largest electrical energy company in Texas.  Their creditors 
included EFIH noteholders.  Each note was governed by an indenture and some were 
secured by a first lien on Debtors’ assets (the “First Lien Notes”).  One set of the First 
Lien Notes represents a principal amount of $500 million with an interest rate of 6 7/8%, 
due in 2017 (the “6 7/8% Notes”).  The other set of Notes represents a principal amount 
of approximately $3.5 billion with an interest rate of 10%, due in 2020 (the “10% 
Notes”).  Each indenture contains a provision providing for a “make-whole” premium, 
which would “compensate noteholders for the loss of future interest resulting from an 
early refinancing.”  Appellant’s Br. 9.  Thus, the make-whole premium would require 
Debtors to make additional payments to the First Lien Noteholders if the Notes were 
redeemed before their final maturity. 
 Debtors sought to restructure this debt in 2012 and began negotiating with 
creditors, including some of the First Lien Noteholders.  Following almost two years of 
negotiation, Debtors and several large creditors, most notably Pacific Investment 
3 
 
Management Company (“PIMCO”), Western Asset Management Company 
(“WAMCO”), and Fidelity Investments (“Fidelity”), agreed to a Restructuring Support 
Agreement (“RSA”), initially intended to accomplish a “global restructuring” of the 
Debtors’ entities and debt.  Although the idea of a global restructuring was eventually 
abandoned, under the RSA, these entities agreed to refinance the First Lien Notes, release 
any claim to a make-whole premium, and provide additional financing.1   
 Because the RSA did not resolve all of their financial problems, Debtors filed for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware.2  One week after filing their bankruptcy petition, Debtors initiated what the 
parties have labeled a “tender offer” directed to the First Lien Noteholders that embodied 
certain terms set forth in the RSA.  The goal of this offer was to settle disputes with all 
First Lien Noteholders.     
 The offer was to remain open for thirty-one days, and offered each First Lien 
Noteholder 105% of the Notes’ principal amount and 101% of the accrued interest in 
exchange for the release of any potential claim to the make-whole premium.  The offer 
contained a “step down” procedure, reducing the principal premium from 5% to 3.25% 
after fourteen days.  The offer notified the First Lien Noteholders that the offer was 
                                              
1 These creditors also provided additional debtor-in-possession financing and 
negotiated a “Most Favored Nations” provision, which provided that if any creditor later 
received a recovery higher than the amount specified in the RSA before “EFIH First Lien 
DIP Financing is fully funded pursuant to a final order entered by the Bankruptcy Court,” 
the RSA would be immediately adjusted to provide the same recovery.  JA 552.  
 2 On the petition date, Debtors also moved for approval of the loans and 
refinancing of the First Lien Notes, and sought a ruling that no make-whole premiums 
were payable. 
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subject to Bankruptcy Court approval and that Debtors intended to initiate litigation to 
disallow the make-whole premium claims.3  Under the make-whole provision, due to the 
lower interest rate and earlier redemption date, the 6 7/8% Noteholders’ make-whole 
premium would have been smaller than that of the 10% Noteholders.  Thus, under the 
terms of the offer,, holders of the 6 7/8% Notes would receive a greater percentage of a 
possible recovery for the make-whole premium than the 10% Noteholders.   
 Ultimately, 97% of the 6 7/8% Noteholders accepted the offer, while only 34% of 
the 10% Noteholders did so.  Noteholders who declined the offer retained their full claim 
and the right to litigate and obtain full value for their make-whole premium.   
 Nine days after initiating the offer, Debtors filed a motion for approval of the 
settlement pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019.  The Trustee, on 
behalf of the non-settling First Lien Noteholders, objected to Debtors’ request for 
approval of the settlement.  Following a hearing at which it heard testimony about the 
benefits of the settlement, including that the offer would save the estate over ten million 
dollars each month in interest payments, the Bankruptcy Court approved the settlement, 
holding that there were no “incidents of discriminatory treatment” in the Debtors’ 
approach to settlement and that the plan was a proper use of estate assets.  JA 169.  The 
District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s approval order.  The Trustee appeals. 
II4 
                                              
3 The Bankruptcy Court has since disallowed the make-whole premium.  This 
ruling is the subject of a separate appeal. 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction over the bankruptcy appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1).  We exercise appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the District Court’s 
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A 
 A bankruptcy court has the authority to “approve a compromise or settlement” of a 
claim “after notice [to the debtor, trustee, and creditors] and a hearing” on the 
compromise.  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a).  The bankruptcy court must then decide whether 
the settlement is “fair and equitable,” In re Nutraquest Inc., 434 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 
2006) (quoting Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. 
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968)), and “assess and balance the value of the claim that 
is being compromised against the value to the estate of . . . accept[ing] . . . the 
compromise” by considering: “(1) the probability of success in ligation; (2) the likely 
difficulties in collection; (3) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, 
inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount interest of the 
creditors.”  In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996).   
 In this case, the Trustee challenges the conclusion that the settlement is fair and 
equitable.  In short, it asserts that use of tender offers as a means to settle claims is 
                                                                                                                                                  
final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291.  We review findings of fact 
made by the bankruptcy court for clear error, and review questions of law de novo.  
Lebron v. Mechem Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1994).  We review the approval of 
a settlement for an abuse of discretion.  In re Nutraquest, Inc., 434 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Under this standard, 
 
[w]e do not disturb an exercise of discretion unless there is a definite and 
firm conviction that the court . . . committed a clear error of judgment in the 
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.  Put another 
way, for us to find an abuse of discretion[,] the . . . decision must rest on a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact.  
 
Id. at 645 (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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impermissible under Chapter 11.  It also argues that the offer violates the equal treatment 
principle.  Finally, it contends that the settlement constituted an impermissible sub rosa 
plan.  We will address each argument in turn. 
A  
  Although the parties have called the arrangement here a “tender offer,” in this 
case it was simply a means to convey a settlement offer to certain creditors who were 
expected to make claims against the assets of the bankruptcy estate.   
 Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), a debtor may use estate property outside the ordinary 
course of business, upon notice and a hearing, to settle claims with the approval of the 
bankruptcy court.  Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 186 F.3d 346, 350 
(3d Cir. 1999); see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019 (providing for bankruptcy court approval of 
settlements).  The bankruptcy court is charged with ensuring that such settlements are 
“fair and equitable.”  See Martin, 91 F.3d at 393 (citation omitted).  Of course, this 
includes confirming that the proposed settlement does not contravene the Bankruptcy 
Code.  
 To the extent the offer allowed noteholders to receive payment in exchange for 
abandoning their make-whole claims constitutes a type of “tender offer,” it clearly did not 
violate the Bankruptcy Code.  The “tender offer” here was merely a mechanism to 
communicate the settlement offer.  It detailed the proposed terms of the offer, set forth 
the reasons for the offer, explained the dispute over make-whole premiums and informed 
creditors of Debtors’ intention to litigate the validity of the claims, disclosed associated 
risk factors, and notified all offerees that the settlement was subject to court approval.  
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Practically speaking, the “tender offer” in this case was equivalent to a detailed 
settlement memorandum in any other case.   
 Moreover, the Trustee has failed to identify any section of the Bankruptcy Code 
that forbids settlements using a tender offer process.5  All of the code sections on which 
the Trustee relies relate to reorganization plans, such as § 1125 (requiring court approval 
for solicitation of a plan), § 1126(c) (providing for class voting on plans), and § 1128 
(plan confirmation), and “class-based” procedures for negotiation inherent to the 
bankruptcy process.  None of the sections apply to court-approved settlements entered 
before the plan confirmation process has begun.  Thus, there is nothing to show the use of 
such a process contravenes the Bankruptcy Code.   
 Having concluded that the settlement offer here did not violate the Code, we next 
examine whether the Bankruptcy Court acted within its discretion in approving the 
settlement.  We conclude that it did. 
 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision reflects thorough consideration of the Martin 
factors concerning the complexity of the litigation over the make-whole claims and the 
delays associated with such a suit.  The EFH bankruptcy is large and complicated.  The 
                                              
5 Indeed, as the parties note, the tender offer process has been used to settle claims 
in other bankruptcy cases.  See In re Standard Oil & Expl. of Del., Inc., 136 B.R. 141, 
144-53 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992); see also In re AMR Corp., 485 B.R. 279 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2013); In re Eastman Kodak Co., 479 B.R. 280 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
19, 2012).  The Trustee argues that the tender offers in these cases are inapposite 
comparisons because the debtors there sought approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior 
to launching their tender offer.  While pre-launch approval may be preferable where 
possible, we see no reason to hold that the order of events dictates whether a settlement 
achieved by a tender offer is fair and equitable.  The Bankruptcy Court retains the 
discretion to determine whether the circumstances and timing surrounding an offer 
undermine its fairness. 
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parties were well aware of the likelihood of protracted litigation regarding the recovery 
on the make-whole premiums.  Thus, the settlement offer significantly reduced the 
“complexity and inconvenience” of the litigation.  Nutraquest, 434 F.3d at 646. 
 The Martin factor concerning the fairness to creditors also supported approving 
the settlement.  The settlement here provided each First Lien Noteholder the ability to 
recover the same proportion of its principal and accrued interest, and made clear Debtors’ 
intent to challenge the validity of the make-whole premiums, placing each creditor on 
notice that its entitlement to such a premium might be eliminated in full.  The settlement 
further detailed numerous risk factors related to the bankruptcy proceeding.  In addition, 
it provided that a noteholder who chose not to settle preserved its claim at the same level 
of priority.  Finally, the settlement immediately saved the estate millions of dollars each 
month and thus provided more assets to satisfy all creditors.6   
                                              
6 Despite these benefits, the Trustee argues with some force that the nature of the 
settlement’s rollout undermines its overall fairness.  Only select creditors participated in 
the initial negotiations, and the offer was released within a week of the bankruptcy 
petition’s filing.  In addition, the offer was conveyed without prior Bankruptcy Court 
approval, and the step-down provision required noteholders to decide very quickly 
whether to sign on or risk their premium payment dropping from 5% to 3.25% fourteen 
days after the tender offer’s initiation.  Under the framework of In re Jevic Holding 
Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), this kind of behavior may undermine the equity of a 
settlement, because creditors may not have an adequate opportunity to assess their 
options and decide whether to accept a settlement.  If the detriment to non-settling 
creditors is sufficient, it may also indicate that the settlement should not be approved 
under Martin.  Nutraquest, 434 F.3d at 647 (discussing the Martin requirement that the 
settlement be in the interest of creditors). On balance, however, this settlement was fair 
and equitable. 
The vast majority of First Lien Noteholders were sophisticated financial entities, 
and there is no indication that any creditor was misled or denied the chance to negotiate 
or participate in the settlement process.  Finally, although bankruptcy court approval 
should generally be sought at the earliest time possible, the offering memorandum clearly 
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  In sum, the offer here is not precluded by the Bankruptcy Code7 and the 
Bankruptcy Court acted within its discretion to approve the offer as a means to settle 
certain claims against the estate. 
B 
 We next address the Trustee’s contention that because holders of the various First 
Lien Notes received different percentages of the potential full value of the make-whole 
premiums, the settlement violates the Bankruptcy Code’s “equal treatment” rule, 11 
U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4).  
 Section 1123(a)(4) embodies the principle that all similarly situated creditors in 
bankruptcy are entitled to equal treatment.  However, under its plain language, the 
provision applies only to a plan of reorganization, and therefore not to pre-confirmation 
settlements.  See id.  Supreme Court precedent and the Bankruptcy Code itself allow for 
settlements to be reached outside of the confirmation process.  See TMT Trailer Ferry, 
390 U.S. at 424; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019.  Thus, we must read the Code’s requirements 
together with the recognition of the importance of compromise in bankruptcy.  See 
                                                                                                                                                  
detailed the terms of the settlement, associated risks, and the need for court approval, and 
hence provided sufficient notice of its terms.  Thus, the pre-approval activities do not 
undermine our conclusion that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion in 
holding that the settlement was fair and equitable. 
 7 This is not a blanket endorsement of all tender offers in bankruptcy.  Rather, like 
other means for achieving settlements in a bankruptcy case, each tender offer must be 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.  See In re Allegheny Int’l, 118 B.R. 282, 295-96 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting a tender offer used to circumvent bankruptcy 
procedures).  Any danger with a tender offer results from the specific offer itself and how 
it is used, and not from an inherent problem with tender offers as a means to settle 
bankruptcy claims.   
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Nutraquest, 434 F.3d at 645; 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9019.01 (16th ed. rev. 2015) 
(“Compromises are favored in bankruptcy.”). 
 As we observed in In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), petition 
for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3285 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2015) (No. 15-649),8 core bankruptcy 
principles, such as the absolute priority rule and the equal treatment rule, see In re W.R. 
Grace & Co., 729 F.3d 332, 343 (3d Cir. 2013), which apply in the plan confirmation 
process, are not categorically applied in the settlement context.  Instead, we adopted a 
flexible approach that permits the approval of settlement that may not comply with such 
rules so long as the bankruptcy court “ensur[es] the evenhanded and predictable treatment 
of creditors.”  Jevic, 787 F.3d at 178.  This does not mean, however, that such rules can 
be ignored.  Indeed, a settlement’s fidelity to the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code 
will generally be the most important factor in determining whether a settlement is fair and 
equitable.  Id. at 184. 
 Even though Jevic teaches that a bankruptcy court has latitude in declining to 
apply confirmation plan rules in connection with settlements, it makes clear that a 
bankruptcy court cannot disregard the central tenets of the bankruptcy system.  See id. at 
180-85.  When a debtor files its petition, it enters into a process in which a bankruptcy 
court is responsible for both protecting estate assets and the interests of the creditors.  As 
to creditors, a bankruptcy court is obligated to ensure that the creditors are treated in an 
                                              
 8 On February 29, 2016, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file a 
brief expressing the views of the United States.  577 U.S.    , available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022916zor_7lho.pdf (last accessed Mar. 
3, 2016) 
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“evenhanded and predictable” fashion, both in and outside of the settlement context.  Id. 
at 184.  Thus, it “may approve settlements that deviate” from treating similarly situated 
creditors equally “only if [it] ha[s] ‘specific and credible grounds to justify the 
deviation.”  Id. (quoting In re Iridium Operating, LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007)).  
We must therefore decide whether there has been a deviation from the equal treatment 
rule here, and, if so, whether the Bankruptcy Court had adequate reasons for doing so. 
 A review of the record demonstrates that the Bankruptcy Court properly 
concluded that there was in fact equal treatment.  First, each First Lien Noteholder was 
offered 105% of the principal note amount, and 101% of the accrued interest.  Thus, each 
Noteholder was offered the same percentage of both principal and accrued interest.  
Second, each was offered the opportunity to retain its rights to seek a “make whole 
remedy.”  Thus, any Noteholder who chose not to settle maintained its entire claim 
against the estate, fully secured by the estate’s assets.   
 Unlike Jevic, wherein the settlement barred an entire class of creditors from relief, 
no group of eligible creditors was deprived of the opportunity to participate.  Thus, the 
settlement offer presented each First Lien Noteholder with a choice and left each to 
decide whether the potential to recover the make-whole premium in full was worth 
foregoing a guaranteed premium payment upon settlement.  This is all that the 
Bankruptcy Code requires.  W.R. Grace & Co., 729 F.3d at 327 (“[C]ourts have 
interpreted the same treatment requirement to mean that all claimants in a class must have 
the same opportunity for recovery.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
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 Although the settlement offer results in differing outcomes when viewed through 
the lens of the total potential recovery on the make-whole premium, mere differences in 
potential final outcomes resulting from choices made by individual creditors do not 
violate the equal treatment protections of § 1123(a)(4).  See In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 442 
B.R. 314, 355 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (citing In re Dana Corp., 412 B.R. 53, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008)).  As the Bankruptcy Court observed, “it certainly isn’t unfair discriminatory 
treatment when we look at simply the fact of the difference between the realization on 
what the make[-w]hole premium might or might not be.”9  JA 169-70.   
 Finally, the settlement does not negatively impact the uninvolved creditors and, in 
fact, actually helps them.  It is undisputed that the proposal, the settlement allowed the 
estate to save well over ten million dollars each month in interest payments.  As a result, 
many junior creditors supported and benefitted from the settlement because the savings 
increased the amount of money available to satisfy lower priority claims. 
 For these reasons, the settlement is not inconsistent with the equal treatment rule. 
C 
 Finally, the Trustee contends that the pre-petition arrangement with PIMCO, 
WAMCO, and Fidelity and the settlement offer constitute an improper sub rosa plan.  
When a transaction or settlement in bankruptcy has the effect of “dictating some of the 
terms of any future reorganization plan,” a court deems the transaction impermissible 
                                              
9 The Bankruptcy Court also noted that PIMCO, WAMCO, and Fidelity received 
some additional consideration, such as the most favored nations clause, but this was not 
discriminatory, because those creditors provided additional benefits to the estate through 
backstop funding commitments and additional financing. 
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because it “short circuits the requirements of Chapter 11 . . . by establishing the terms of 
the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets.”  Jevic, 787 F.3d at 187 (Scirica, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 
935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983)).  The “hallmark of such a plan is that it dictates the terms of a 
reorganization plan.”  Id. at 188. 
 The settlement here does not constitute a sub rosa plan.  Outside of the settling 
noteholders, there is no indication, and the Trustee has provided no evidence showing, 
that any other creditor’s recovery is impacted by the settlement, or that any requirement 
of Chapter 11 is subverted by the plan.  Because the settlement neither subverts the 
bankruptcy process nor impermissibly dictates the outcome to other creditors, it is not a 
sub rosa plan. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
